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 Introduction 
 The concept of the rule of law was originally developed in the context of 
domestic legal systems characterized by a high degree of centralization,
institutionalization, and hierarchization. 1 During the last two decades, 
though, significant efforts have been undertaken to apply this concept to 
the international legal order. The growing consensus on the importance 
of the rule of law is best demonstrated in the field of international trade,
which currently functions as one of the most regulated and institutional-
ized domains of global governance. It is now widely recognized that the 
rule of law strengthens international trade and that international trade can
reinforce the rule of law accordingly. 2 On the one hand, domestic legal 
systems and international law can provide a stable legal environment that 
regulates imports and exports, constrains protectionism, and favors foreign
investment. On the other hand, the use of international arbitration or dis-
pute settlement at the national and international levels strengthens the rule
of law. Even the general recognition in international trade regulations that
“the best form of dispute settlement is dispute avoidance”3 reinforces the 
rule of law as it pushes states to adopt transparent and publicly accessible
trade regulations.
 The aim of this chapter is to inquire into the European Union (EU)-
China strategic partnership’s contribution to the rule of law at the inter-
national level, in the particular context of the World Trade Organization
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(WTO). More specifically, we analyze the EU’s relationship with China in
the context of the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism (DSM), hypoth-
esizing that the use the two strategic partners make of the DSM contributes
to the enhancement of the international rule of law. 
 For that purpose, we first explain the importance of the rule of law in the 
context of the WTO. Subsequently, we consider the EU-China relationship 
in the WTO and more specifically the way in which both players make use
of the WTO’s DSM in their bilateral trade relations. Finally, we analyze two
recent cases that were brought before the WTO’s DSM by the EU, namely 
the raw materials and the rare earths disputes, in order to assess the actual
contribution of EU-China dispute settlement to the enhancement of the rule
of law at the international level. The main argument defended by this chapter
is that the practical use the EU and China make of the DSM reinforces the
international rule of law in international trade. Such use nevertheless also
demonstrates that the heritage of China’s accession protocol and its overall 
implementation in the DSM challenge some important aspects of the inter-
national rule of law, in particular the clarity and equality before WTO law.
 The International Rule of Law and the WTO 
 Despite increasing difficulties in adapting to the needs of its members—
as best exemplified by the current stalemate in the Doha Development
Agenda (DDA)—the WTO still functions as the premier institution that 
regulates international trade in goods and services. The ultimate objective
of the organization is raising standards of living, ensuring full employment, 
and expanding trade in and production of goods and services.4
 The WTO arguably best testifies to the importance of the rule of law in
international trade governance. According to James Bacchus, “the WTO is
offering persuasive evidence to the world for the very first time that there
truly can be something deserving of being called international law, and, 
thus, that there truly can be the international rule of law.”5 The WTO
indeed offers a multilateral governance system that goes far beyond “power
politics in disguise”6 and provides for both a “legalization” and “judicializa-
tion” of international trade relations.7
 First, it benefits from strong legal foundations that are grounded in vari-
ous multilateral agreements, notably the core agreements that cover trade in
goods (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, GATT 1994)8 and
services (General Agreement on Trade in Services, GATS),9 and the protec-
tion of intellectual property rights (Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights, TRIPS).10 To these agreements must be added
all the rules that are included in the specific accession protocols of newly 
acceded members to the WTO.11
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 Second, the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), nota-
bly its Article 23, requires WTO members to seek redress of a violation of 
WTO obligations by using the rules and procedures of the Understanding. 12
The DSU constitutes therefore a unique instrument that provides for com-
pulsory jurisdiction and empowers the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) to
judge the compliance of WTO members with the rules of the WTO. The
decisions of the DSB, based on the reports of panels or the appellate body 
(AB), are binding for the member concerned and are, generally speaking, 
well implemented. The good compliance records are testimony of a “clear 
movement toward an international rule of law to act in anticipation of com-
pliance with WTO obligations.” 13 In addition, panel and AB reports, as
well as DSB decisions have now developed into a large body of jurispru-
dence both in terms of procedural and substantive rules. 14
 Third, the WTO’s Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) creates a 
framework for a peer-review process that imposes international scrutiny on
WTO members’ practice in international trade. In that process, the fear of 
seeing one’s reputation tarnished can constitute a major “deterrent mecha-
nism” against States’ temptations to violate international trade rules.15 The 
TPRM eventually leads to an enhancement of the transparency and under-
standability of the trade policies of WTO members.
 The EU and China in the WTO: Different Histories, 
Similar Objectives 
 While the EU is one of the founding members of the WTO and has 
assumed the role of a genuine rule maker thanks to its active role in the 
various rounds of trade negotiations, China gained access to the WTO only 
in 2001 after more than 15 years of intense negotiations.16 At that time, 
“trade policy makers understood that the international organization could
not pretend to govern world trade with such an important trading nation 
outside of the World Trade Organization.”17 In fact, China’s accession con-
stitutes probably the “greatest WTO-era achievement.” 18 Importantly, the
EU supported, to a very large extent, the Chinese accession to the WTO.
The Union took the view that this accession constituted the best incentive
for China to respect international trade rules and to increase the trade flows
between the EU and China. This calculation proved to be accurate: trade
flows between the EU and China increased by more than 300 percent in the
ten years following the accession of China to the WTO. 19
 From China’s perspective, the accession to the WTO became a necessity 
to pursue and enhance its policies of reform and opening up. 20 Obtaining 
most favored nation (MFN) status was one of the main incentives in seek-
ing access to the WTO. According to this principle, “each contracting party 
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shall accord to the commerce of the other contracting parties treatment no 
less favorable than that provided for in the appropriate part of the appro-
priate schedule annexed to this agreement.”21 Nevertheless, China had to
pay a very high price to obtain membership as the market access require-
ments for China’s accession and other commitments were notably “far more 
reaching than those made by any member that has joined the World Trade 
Organization since 1995.”22 In addition to an average tariff rate below 
10 percent for imports,23 China is also bound by several so-called “WTO-
Plus” and “WTO-Minus” obligations under the accession protocol. 24 These 
include commitments on transparency, transitional product-specific safe-
guard clauses, the annual review of Chinese trade laws during the first ten
years after accession, the elimination of export duties, and “special price
comparison in determining anti-dumping.”25
 More than ten years after its accession, China has arguably made great
progress in transforming its legal and economic systems to comply with 
its WTO commitments.26 In addition, it has also become increasingly 
acquainted with the WTO’s functioning. China’s actions in the WTO now 
incorporate all the elements of the four strategies in the country’s multi-
lateral diplomacy.27 First, right after its accession, China took the stance 
of a patient watcher in the context of the DSM. It participated as a Third 
Party to most of the cases that were brought before the DSB. This low-
profile strategy was mainly aimed at addressing its own lack of expertise in
international trade law and was a way of becoming acquainted with WTO 
procedures. Second, China became more and more  engaged in the DSM, 
acting first as a reluctant litigant in the position of a respondent, and later
as a more active litigant in both the positions of respondent and complain-
ant.28 China has, until today, been involved in 45 cases since its accession: 
12 times as a complainant and 33 times as a defendant. Interestingly, all
the cases that have been brought by China were against its main trading 
partners, the EU and the United States. Third, and in addition to its grow-
ing involvement in the WTO, China is also engaged in the negotiations 
of a very diverse set of bi- or plurilateral trade agreements (RTAs) and
therefore also  circumvents the WTO architecture. China’s propensity for
developing a large and comprehensive network of free trade agreements
(FTAs) is “motivated by a desire to develop alternative negotiation forums
to advance China’s economic interests.” 29 While this holds particularly true
for all WTO members, the quest for securing bilateral and regional FTA’s 
is particularly important for China given its “backward position” in the 
current multilateral trade negotiations.30 It is arguable that China has so far
not tried to shape the organization: “there is scant evidence that China has
played the disruptive, blocking role that has been ascribed to it.”31 An inter-
esting development in this respect is China’s objection to a recent Appellate
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Body report. In US-Tuna II , the Appellate Body considered that a TBT
Committee Decision constituted a “subsequent agreement” in the sense of 
Article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.32 China 
has fiercely objected to this interpretation, which it considers to be incon-
sistent with the provisions of the DSU.33 In the DDA negotiations so far, 
China has kept a low profile.34 On the one hand, the position of China in 
the DDA is directly framed by the Chinese reluctance to abide with any 
additional commitment without reciprocity. 35 China already gave up a lot 
to obtain its membership and is not willing to go beyond these commit-
ments. On the other hand, China is still not willing to undertake a lead-
ership role in order not to damage its relationship with other developing 
countries within the WTO.36
 EU-China Trade Disputes and the WTO 
 Looking more specifically into the EU-China relationship, it is arguable
that economic links and expectations for mutual economic benefits have 
always been “the main driver of cooperation”37 between the EU and the
People’s Republic of China (PRC). In the wake of its “opening and reforms 
policy,” China has become the second-largest trading partner of the EU over
the last years. The EU is now the main trading partner of China. Through 
growing exchanges, both markets have become highly intertwined and are,
in fact, interdependent.38
 In spite of the increasingly comprehensive partnership between the
EU and China, growing interdependence has also brought many difficul-
ties and disagreements between both blocks. In this process, differences in 
ideological background play a role, but do not offer a full explanation. It 
is the ever-growing trade deficit that questions, in fact, the existence of 
a well-balanced and mutually beneficial economic relationship. 39 While
economic theories diverge on the question whether macroeconomic imbal-
ances are a severe issue that should be solved, Europe and China each have
their own explanations to justify the existence of a major trade deficit in 
their bilateral economic relationship. On the one hand, the EU regularly 
complains about market access issues in China, particularly in the field of 
services. The EU Chamber of Commerce in China, while recognizing the 
positive impact of the Shanghai Pilot Free Trade Zone, recently pointed to
the necessity of lifting investment constraints as well as of addressing fre-
quent indirect and hidden restrictions.40 On the other hand, China is facing 
rising protectionism and a lack of trust in Europe. It remains, as of today,
the primary target of European antidumping measures. 41 This extensive use 
of antidumping measures is perceived as a tool used by the EU to close its
market. In this context, China is still very much affected by and opposed to
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its nonrecognition as a market economy—a strong symbolic and economic 
challenge to its trade policy. It challenges, indeed, the lack of recognition
of the great changes generated by its policy of opening up and reforms, 42
which makes it easier for the EU to apply antidumping measures against 
Chinese products. In practice, China’s nonmarket economy status implies 
that the EU can determine the normal value of Chinese products for the 
purpose of an antidumping investigation on the basis of an analogous third
country methodology according to the EU Anti-Dumping Regulation. 43
 All these difficulties have arguably been reinforced in the context of 
the recent financial and economic turmoil in Europe and in the United 
States. While China’s export-driven economy suffered from the decreasing 
demand in Europe and in the United States, the crises also enabled China 
to raise its profile internationally and to voice its demands for structural
changes in international economic and financial governance. 44 “China’s
increasing leverage”45 has more particularly enabled it to “divide and con-
quer” in Europe by orienting its investments in strategic European sectors
thanks to a lack of political cohesion and coordination in Europe.46 These 
changes in the balance of economic power have led Europe to fear that 
China could have actually started “buying up Europe,”47 and China to
blame Europe for its difficulties in “putting its own house in order.” The 
decreasing mutual trust, along with China’s growing self-confidence, has led 
to the revival and development of a number of contentious issues. Recent
concerns about export restrictions on raw materials and rare earths as well
as complaints about illegal measures affecting the renewable energy sector 
are among the latest examples of a state of play that has become ever more
confrontational.
 In that context, both actors have increasingly made use of the WTO’s
DSM to resolve their bilateral trade disputes. Nevertheless, there are other
explanations for this development as well.48 First, as indicated above, China 
has strongly increased its capacity to participate in WTO dispute settlement 
since its accession in 2001.49 In addition to considerable investments in 
WTO law teaching and research within Chinese universities,50 China has
successfully established public-private partnerships in order to facilitate the
sharing of information between the government and businesses. 51 Second, 
even if there is a growing number of contentious issues that inevitably leads 
to an increase in the number of cases, it was already clear at the time of 
China’s accession to the WTO that some of these issues would come up 
before the DSM as they were not adequately addressed or resolved during 
the negotiations of China’s accession protocol. 52
 The DSM is arguably used when bilateral discussions fail to bring a solu-
tion. 53 Although very demanding, filing a case with the WTO can prove
to have two major advantages. First, the DSM operates on the basis of a 
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strongly developed legal framework with which both actors have to abide,
and which has the authority to ensure that decisions are effectively enforced.
In this respect, both the EU and China highly value the DSM and have so
far generally implemented DSB decisions satisfactorily in cases in which they 
stood against each other. 54 The only Article 21.5 DSU compliance panel 
in a dispute between the two countries was established upon the request of 
China. It aims at determining whether the measures taken by the EU in the 
dispute on steel fasteners 55 respected the recommendations and rulings of 
the DSB. Second, WTO dispute settlement also allows the complainants
to act not only individually but also jointly with other members—a burden
sharing that the EU has recently exercised together with the United States, 
Mexico, and Japan. This burden sharing also allows the EU to share the
political and economic costs of a complaint with other WTO members. 56
 Also interesting is the nature of the cases that have been brought before 
the WTO. The table below indicates that disputes not only concern sensi-
tive issues that rank high in the bilateral relationship but also mirror changes
in the nature and priorities of the European and Chinese economies. This
is particularly true for the two case studies of this chapter. China-Raw 
Materials and China-Rare Earths not only have not major legal implications 
but also concern issues that are central in terms of energy security and the 
fight against climate change—two challenges identified by China 57 and the
EU58 as strategic priorities. These two concerns are closely intertwined 59
and relate both to the difficulties of combining sustainable development 
and the need to secure access to natural resources ( table 6.1 ). 
 China-Raw Materials (DS395) and  China-Rare Earths (DS432)
China-Raw Materials (DS395) concerns restrictions on exports imposed on
certain raw materials by China. These include the exports of various forms
of bauxite, coke, fluorspar, magnesium, manganese, silicon carbide, silicon
metal, yellow phosphorus, and zinc. There is a very limited world supply 
for these materials, and China is the main producer worldwide.60 For the 
EU, a large number of industrial activities ranging from the steel industry 
to nanotechnologies depend on the availability of these raw materials. The
raw materials sector furthermore employs as many as 30 million workers
and is of central importance in the development of green technologies.61
It was with this in mind that the EU brought  China-Raw Materials before 
the WTO DSM, along with Mexico and the United States, who alleged
that the export restrictions increased the price on international markets and
favored Chinese industries that could get raw materials for a lower and
more stable price. China defended its measures by arguing that its export
restrictions were aimed at conserving exhaustible natural resources (Art. XX 
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(g) GATT 1994) as well as protecting human, animal, or plant life or health
(Art. XX (b) GATT 1994). 
 The key findings of the Panel were twofold and concerned both duties
and quotas applied by China on raw materials.62 First, export duties that 
include taxes and charges imposed on exports were found to violate Paragraph
 Table 6.1  EU-China trade disputes at the WTOa
 Dispute  Date  Complainant 
China—Measures Affecting Imports
of Automobile Parts
March 30, 2006 European Communities
China—Measures Affecting 
Financial Information Services
and Foreign Financial Information 
Suppliers
March 3, 2008 European Communities
China—Measures Related to
the Exportation of Various Raw 
Materials
June 23, 2009 European Communities
European Communities—Definitive
Anti-dumping Measures on Certain
Iron or Steel Fasteners from China
July 31, 2009 China
European Union—Anti-dumping 
Measures on Certain Footwear from
China
February 4, 2010 China
Provisional Anti-dumping Duties
on Certain Iron and Steel Fasteners
from the European Union
May 7, 2010 European Union
China—Definitive Anti-dumping 
Duties on X-Ray Security Inspection
Equipment from the European Union
July 25, 2011 European Union
China—Measures Related to
the Exportation of Rare Earths, 
Tungsten, and Molybdenum
March 13, 2012 European Union
European Union and Certain
Member States—Certain Measures
affecting the Renewable Energy 
Generation Sector
November 5, 2012 China
China—Measures Imposing 
Anti-dumping Duties on High-
Performance Stainless Steel Seamless 
Tubes (“HP-SSST”) from the
European Union
June 13, 2013 European Union
a See  http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/find_dispu_cases_e.htm?year=none&subject=none&
agreement=none&member1=EEC&member2=CHN&complainant1=true&complainant2=true&respond
ent1=true&respondent2=true&thirdparty1=false&thirdparty2=false#results . At the time of writing, China 
had notified the WTO Secretariat of a request for consultations with the EU on measures relating to tariff 
concessions on certain poultry meat products. 
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11.3 of China’s protocol of accession, which stipulates the conditions for
applying export duties. 63 While export restrictions in the form of quotas 
are banned under the GATT 1994, export duties are authorized and con-
stitute, generally speaking, an important lever for developing countries to
protect their natural resources.64 In the negotiations for its accession, China 
nevertheless agreed to stop imposing export duties on all but 84 products as
part of its WTO-Plus obligations. 65 Most interestingly, the Panel ruled that 
China could not benefit from the general exceptions foreseen in Article XX 
(b) or (g) of the GATT 1994. These exceptions relate to the conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources (g) and the protection of human, animal, or
plant life or health (b). The absence of any reference to Article XX GATT
1994 in Paragraph 11.3 of China’s accession protocol made it impossible for
China to justify the duties on that basis. Second, the Panel ruled that export
quotas are forbidden by Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 and that China 
did not successfully prove that these quotas were “temporarily applied” in
order to “prevent or relieve a critical shortage.” These two key findings were
upheld by the Appellate Body.66 This ruling has arguably a major impact on 
China’s industrial policy, as it requires China to put an end to a practice that 
partly aimed at protecting rising domestic demand for raw materials while 
restricting the exports in order to protect the environment.67
 On March 13, 2012, the EU requested consultations with China regard-
ing China’s restrictions on the export of rare earth elements in a dispute that
became DS432: China-Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, 
Tungsten and Molybdenum. Rare earths are chemical elements necessary for 
the development of green technologies, such as electric cars and solar panels. 
China is by far the largest supplier of rare earths (around 97%), although it 
only holds around 36 percent to 48 percent of world reserves. 68 In the words 
of former EU commissioner for trade Karel De Gucht, “China’s restrictions 
on rare earths and other products violate international trade rules and must be
removed. These measures hurt our producers and consumers in the EU and 
across the world, including manufacturers of pioneering hi-tech and ‘green’
business applications.” 69 Even if the EU “encourages all countries to promote 
an environmentally friendly and sustainable production of raw materials,” it
considers that export restrictions do not achieve this objective. 70
 As in China-Raw Materials , the EU raised the issue of compliance of 
China’s export duties with Paragraph 11.3 of the accession protocol. The
question of the applicability of Article XX of the GATT as a justification
for a breach of the obligations under Paragraph 11.3 of the protocol was 
therefore relevant again. China put forward arguments of resource scarcity 
as well as environmental harm caused by the exploitation of rare earths in
order to defend its industrial practice.71 A Panel was established on July 
10, 2012, and the Panel Report was circulated on March 26, 2014.72 The 
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Report declared, as it did in China-Raw Materials , that “the majority of the 
Panel agreed with the complainants and found that the ‘General Exceptions’
contained in Article XX of the GATT 1994 are not available to justify a 
breach of the obligation to eliminate export duties contained in China’s
Accession Protocol. Accordingly, the majority held that China could not 
invoke the exception in Article XX(b) to seek to justify its export duties.”73
The findings were upheld by the Appellate Body.74
 The overall debate on the DSB rulings relates to the status of China’s 
accession protocol and  WTO-Plus obligations in the WTO legal system. 
This systemic question has been pending for a very long time in the WTO,
and the case law has hardly produced a unified and clear interpretation.75 In 
a discussion directly linked to this legal uncertainty, the DSB questioned, in 
China-Raw Materials and China-Rare Earth , the availability of the general
exceptions of Article XX of the GATT 1994 to justify breaches of obliga-
tions that fall beyond the scope of the GATT 1994 but are included in the 
accession protocol as part of China’s  WTO-Plus obligations. Both the Panel 
and Appellate Body reports on China-Raw Materials and China-Rare Earth
chose a very restrictive approach and ruled that “Article XX defences are per 
se available only for violations of GATT 1994 provisions, whereas the legal 
basis to resort to such defences for violations of non-GATT obligations
is the text of incorporation by cross-reference.” 76 The absence of a direct 
reference to Article XX of the GATT in Paragraph 11.3 of the Accession 
Protocol denies China the right to justify its export duties on that basis.
 Although there is no discussion regarding the DSB’s capacity to enforce 
the provisions of the accession protocol, 77 the conclusions reached in these 
two cases are certainly highly debated.78 China furthermore reacted very 
emotionally against the decisions in the two disputes. While the EU con-
siders WTO cases strictly in economic and legal terms, China still has a 
tendency to see them in a much more political way.79 Having gained exper-
tise in international trade law, China now critically considers its accession
protocol and tries to avoid as much as possible discriminatory practices
that do not directly fall under the GATT 1994. In addition, the restrictive
interpretation of China’s accession protocol has raised many concerns and 
criticisms, especially from the side of other developing and emerging coun-
tries, which can point to these “very irrational and controversial” aspects
of multilateral trade governance.80 In this respect, Argentina, Brazil, and
Russia endorsed an approach that sought to ascertain the common inten-
tion of the drafters. Russia even made a very strong and assertive statement 
that departed from the usual highly diplomatic language used by WTO
members before the DSB. In this statement, Russia expressed its “serious
concern” as the findings in China-Rare Earths clearly depart from the assur-
ance that was given to Russia during the negotiations for its accession that
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 [i]n accordance with well-established customary practices of the WTO and
the understanding shared by the Members ( . . . ) all Members have equal
availability of defences under the WTO Agreement in the context of the 
whole integrity of all parts of the WTO Agreement, in particular Multilateral 
Trade Agreements and Protocols of accession, with or without specific refer-
ence to such defences in the Protocol of accession. 81
 Whether an alternative approach was possible was confirmed in the dissent-
ing opinion expressed in the Panel Report in China-Rare Earths . It reads
as follows: “unless China explicitly gave up its right to invoke Article XX 
of GATT 1994, which it did not, the general exception provisions of the
GATT 1994 are available to China to justify a violation of Paragraph 11.3 
of its Accession Protocol. I see nothing in China’s Accession Protocol that
clearly indicates such a waiver.”82
 While China indeed did not explicitly give up its right to invoke Article 
XX of GATT 1994, the accession protocol does nevertheless not directly 
refer either to the availability of the general exceptions of the GATT for
Paragraph 11.3 or for all the provisions included in the accession proto-
col. In contrast, other accession protocols such as those of Albania (2000)
and Croatia (2000) make it clear that exceptions to the accession proto-
col can only be imposed in conformity with the WTO Agreement.83 This
distinction explains the diversity in the existing case law on the relation-
ship between China’s accession protocol and the WTO agreements. In
China-Publications and Audiovisual Products , for example, the Appellate
Body endorsed the Chinese argument that it could benefit from the excep-
tions foreseen in Article XX of the GATT because there was an explicit 
reference to the WTO Agreement in the next section of China’s accession 
protocol.84
 Reflections from an International Rule of Law Perspective
 The question now is what these two cases tell us about the international rule
of law. On the one hand, it is arguable that these two disputes demonstrate 
that issues central to the EU-China relationship as well as to global gover-
nance are being brought to the WTO’s DSM. This reliance on multilateral-
ism and the jurisdiction of the DSM in the field of trade supports, to a great 
extent the development of, and respect for, the international rule of law.
The supremacy of the law and the effective implementation of rules shape
bilateral relationships and help resolve bilateral disputes. This is a strong and 
positive signal and certainly a significant contribution to the enhancement
of the strategic partnership between China and the EU. It adds, in fact, legal 
certainty, transparency, and jurisdictional control in the international trade 
practices of China and the EU in the field of international trade. 
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 On the other hand, the conclusions reached in the cases  China-Raw 
Materials and China-Rare Earths may, in the long run, constitute a chal-
lenge to the international rule of law as developed and protected in the 
context of the WTO. The conclusions in  China-Raw Materials and China-
Rare Earths reinforce, in fact, a dual regime that does not place original 
members of the WTO and acceding countries on an equal footing. This 
dual regime is a direct consequence of the strong leverage original members
of the WTO have to push acceding members to agree upon conditions that
go far beyond the obligations foreseen under the GATT (i.e.,  WTO-Plus
and  WTO-Minus obligations). A notable example of this dual regime is
that original members do not have an obligation to banish export duties,
while new members are in some cases required, under their terms of acces-
sion, to stop applying export duties.85 The Panel decisions in  China-Raw 
Materials and China-Rare Earths arguably recognized the ability of sovereign 
states—which committed to abide by certain  WTO-Plus or  WTO-Minus
obligations—to “sign away their rights to pursue public policies, such as
environmental protection.”86 This can be perceived, to a certain extent, as
a “deplorable”87 precedent that also reinforces the existing nonreciprocity 
between original members and those new members who have committed
not to use export duties.
 It is submitted that the dual regime engendered by the inclusion of a great
number of WTO-Plus and WTO-Minus obligations within accession proto-
cols challenges some fundamental aspects of the international rule of law.
 First, the negotiation of accession protocols that go far beyond the gen-
eral obligations included in the WTO Agreement challenge the principle of 
equality of all WTO members in the application of WTO law. The prin-
ciple of equality is at the core of the WTO, as best emphasized by the
Single Undertaking Rule that was introduced by the Uruguay Round. In
accordance with the Single Undertaking, membership in the WTO is an
“‘all-or-nothing’ proposition—members must sign on to all WTO treaty 
regimes, and as a general rule, no reservations or exceptions are permit-
ted.”88 The package to which new WTO members have to subscribe is 
therefore “applied simultaneously and inseparably,” which should provide 
for the equality of all WTO members in the realm of WTO law. 89 With this
in mind, the conclusions reached in  China-Raw Materials and China-Rare 
Earths challenge the Single Undertaking and the equality of all the WTO
members before WTO laws in two ways. On the one hand, the reliance
on nonreciprocal obligations foreseen by accession protocols “undermines 
the aspiration of the WTO to be a truly multilateral, rules-based organiza-
tion.” 90 On the other hand, the availability of general exceptions detailed in
Article XX of the GATT 1994 appears to be contested or at least not crystal 
clear for nonoriginal members who wish to justify breaches of obligations
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included in the accession protocol. In these two cases, China’s “less-than-
equal status” as produced by a very stringent accession protocol is reinforced 
to a point that it may challenge some of the main principles underpinning 
the WTO system, namely reciprocity and equal treatment. 91
 Second, WTO-Plus and WTO-Minus obligations negotiated in the 
accession process are very often “informally, or even haphazardly” created
and therefore strongly complicate the role of the DSB. 92 They challenge, to 
a certain extent, the clarity of WTO law as they leave a great scope for inter-
pretation. While the clarity of legal texts should not be achieved at all costs,
it significantly provides for legal predictability, and in that sense helps assure
justice. 93 While it is not questionable that WTO Panels have to rely on the 
texts of the accession protocols and Working Party Reports and not on the
possible intentions of the drafters of these texts, the two disputes testimony 
that China’s accession protocol can be questioned for its overall coherence 
and clarity of its provisions. 
 It is notable that the conclusions endorsed by the DSB followed, to large
degree, the arguments developed by the EU in the two cases. In  China-Raw 
Materials , the EU argued that the extended application of the exceptions
included in Article XX of the GATT to obligations included in the acces-
sion protocol would constitute “an extremely slippery slope.”94 This point
of view was repeated in the debate on China-Rare Earths , in which the EU
put forward that the accession protocol “reflects rights and obligations that
were ‘tailor-made’ for China” and should therefore not be submitted to the
general exceptions of the GATT “unless specifically stated.”95 In these two 
cases, the EU was clearly driven by a strong political will to defend its trade
interests, that is, in fine the main purpose of bringing a case before the
WTO DSB. It therefore supported a restrictive understanding of China’s
accession protocol to make its case against breaches of some of China’s 
WTO commitments.
 While the EU approach is fully understandable from the perspective of 
the protection of the EU’s trade interests, the critiques and controversies
that followed these two disputes should lead the EU to question its overall
perspective on WTO-Plus and WTO-Minus obligations. In line with Article
21 TEU, the EU puts indeed the promotion of the rule of law at the core
of its external action.96 The EU now advocates the benefits of strengthening 
the rule of law at both the national and international levels and has, in this
respect, encouraged China to launch a new “legal affairs” dialogue as part of 
the political pillar of the EU-China strategic partnership. As an actor that 
strives for coherence across its external policies, the EU should reflect upon
the relevance to push acceding members to agree on obligations that go far
beyond those included in the WTO Agreement. Striving for more equality 
and clarity in international trade law would only reinforce the EU’s strategic
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objective of promoting the rule of law, more particularly vis- à -vis its strate-
gic partners such as China.
 Conclusion 
 In spite of their very different experiences in the WTO, China and the EU
contribute to the enhancement of the international rule of law in trade mul-
tilateralism thanks to the use they make of the WTO’s DSM. Nevertheless,
the heritage of China’s accession process still has a great influence, even in
a context that has changed to a very large extent. In this respect,  China-
Rare Earths and China-Raw Materials shed light on the potential negative
impacts that  WTO-Plus and WTO-Minus obligations might have on some 
of the key fundamentals of the rule of law, namely the principle of equality 
and clarity of WTO law.
 Since promoting the rule of law is an integral part of the EU’s external
action, the criticism of the Panel decisions should particularly inform the 
EU strategy when it participates in accession negotiations in the framework 
of the WTO. It indeed appears that the WTO’s accession process challenges
the enhancement of the rule of law in international trade governance and 
therefore questions the overall coherence of EU external action. It is only 
by achieving a greater coherence among its foreign policies that the EU
can enhance the “effectiveness, legitimacy and credibility” of its external
action.97
 The political impact of these cases should not be underestimated. These
disputes are “merely the tip of the iceberg”: the WTO dual regime and the
increasing gap between historical and new WTO members has indeed led 
a number of developing and emerging countries to start reconsidering their
trade relationship with the developed world. 98 Bearing in mind the strong 
reactions of Russia and other WTO members, it is very likely that the issue
of sovereignty over national resources will come back in future rounds of 
negotiations at the WTO. In order not to erode the DSM, a major cor-
nerstone in the development of the international rule of law, it appears 
primordial that the EU along with the other WTO members learn from the
experience of the China accession protocol and its actual implementation 
and work together for the maintenance of the unicity of WTO law. 
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